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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
16355

-vsLARRY VALE POTTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by complaint and information
with one count of aggravated robbery, a violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1953), as amended; one count of
failure to stop at the command of a police officer, a
violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

41-6-169.10, as repealed,

1978; and one count of aggravated assault, a violation of
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-103

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITIOH IN THE LmiER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable
Boyd

Bunnell in the Seventh Judicial District Court for

Carbon County and found guilty of aggravated robbery and
failure to stop at the command of a police officer on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
November 22,
1978.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Following a presentence investigation and report
appellant was sentenced to a term of 5 years to life in
the Utah State Prison with a fine of $2,000.

Execution of

the prison sentence and payment of $1,500 of the fine.were
I

suspended for 5 years and appellant was placed on probation.

1

Appellant's probation was revoked on May 23, 1979, I

Upor.'

and he was ordered committed to the Utah State Prison.

I

I

filing a Notice of Appeal and a Certificate of Probable
Cause signed by the Honorable J. Frank i\Tilkins of this
Court, appellant was allowed to remain free on bond pending
the decision of this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT OH APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict and
sentence of the lower court as well as affirmance of the
action of that court in revoking appellant's probation.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 22, 1978, Von Hayne Johnston and his

wife responded to a knock at _their door in i\Tellington, utah, 1
at 1:30 a.m.

(T. at 3,17).

1

Upon opening the door, Mr.
. I

Johnston confronted appellant who stood with a cocked pis:o.
I

at his side

(T. at 6).

Appellant stated,

"I want in.

Let

me in," and then followed Mr. Johnston into his house.

1

T. refers to the transcript
R. refers
21 and 22, 1978.
H. refers to the transcript
why probation should not be

of the trial held November
to the record on appeal.
of the hear:..ng to show ca'JSc
revoked held !1ay 23, 197 9.
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When they reached the kitchen, appellant said, "I want
a roll of toilet paper and some matches." Mr. Johnston
got some matches out of a kitchen cabinet and his wife
retrieved a roll of toilet paper from the bathroom
(T. at 4,17-18).

The items were placed in appellant's

hat and Mrs. Johnston was told that she was no longer
needed (T. at 4).

She went to the sewing room where,

because of on-going remodeling, she could see into the
living room and observed her husband and appellant as
they went out the front door (T. at 18).

On the front

porch, the roll of toilet paper fell out of appellant's
hat and appellant got "kind of nervous"

(T. at 4).

Mr.

Johnston put his hands on the door while appellant
picked up the roll (T. at 5 and 18).

Appellant then said

"thank you,"shook Mr. Johnston's hand, got in his car and
drove away at a very rapid pace (T. at 5 and 13).

Mrs.

Johnston then called the highway patrol (T. at 18).
Mr. Johnston noted that he thought appellant
might well shoot him or his wife.

He stated that appellant

walked and talked normally and did not sway or lean
against the wall.
that he accelerated

He said appellant drove normally except
very quickly (T. at 12-13).

He did

not think appellant was drunk (T. at 16).
Mrs. Johnston testified that although appellant
had seemed in a daze, with a blank expression, he had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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walked normally and that his eyes and demeanor had
seemed about the same at the preliminary hearing
(T. at 19,20).

She had seen appellant at a bank some

time after the incident and immediately noticed that his
voice sounded the same, which frightened her at that
time considerably (T. at 20-21).

She stated that she

thought something was wrong with appellant largely
because of what he asked for and that her analysis of
appellant's mental state would have changed if he had
asked for a large sum of money (T.at 26 and 28).

She

could not smell any alcohol about his person (T. at 27).
Officer Larry Prince of the East Carbon City
Police DepartQent, after having been notified by the
Price dispatcher, spotted appellant and gave chase
(T. at 30).

With both his overhead lights and siren

on, he reached a speed of 110 miles per hour as he
followed appellant toward Green River, Utah (T. at 30).
Eventually appellant's car stopped and appellant stood
in the middle of the road with a gun in his hand (T. at
48).

Officer Prince kept his distance and waited for

other officers to arrive (T. at 31-32).
As Officer Larry Penrod of the Price City PolicE
Department sped past Officer Prince, appellant got into
his car and turned back towards Price (T. at 48).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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After

very nearly having a head-on collision with another Price
City police car driven by Officer Vuksinik (T. at 32,48
and 57), appellant continued towards Price with all three
police cars in pursuit with lights and sirens on (T. at
49).

Officer Prince described the chase:
On occasions we reached speeds up to
70 or more miles an hour.
Several times
the subject slammed on his brakes, trying
to disable Officer Penrod's car--tailgate
him.
He stopped several other times. We
tried to talk him out of the car and he
would proceed.
He would not get out of the car.
Finally, we passed the Horse Canyon Hine Junction
and headed toward Columbia.
Several other times
he slammed on his brakes.
At one time he
motioned at Officer Penrod to come up alongside.
So Officer Penrod went up--to pull up to try
and get in front of him so we could stop the
vehicle.
Q.
How did he motion?
A.
With his left arm.
I couldn't really
tell exactly what he was doing.
I could see a
hand, maybe, you know, sticking out.
So
Penrod pulled up alongside of the car and at
that time I saw the suspect vehicle swerve to
the left, hitting Officer Penrod's right front.
He went off to the left in the barrow pit and
back in to the road, almost lost control of his
vehicle. A little bit later his vehicle stopped
again and we tried talking him out. And he went
to get out of the car but then he took off again.
Several times this happened.

(T. at 33-34).
Officer Prince stated further that "every time
Officer Penrod would try to pull alongside, he would control
his car enough to block off the lane of travel.
using his r.1irrors.

He was

He had full control of his car."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(T. at 46, see also T. at 49).

His driving was not

characteristic of someone who was under the influence
of alcohol, according to Officer Prince (T. at 46).
Officer Penrod added that " . . . while going
around one of the curves, I

observed the suspect reach

back towards us with a hand gun, and I
from the weapon,"

(T. at 49).

observed a flash

He stated that appellant

was not a candidate for a charge of driving under the
influence and that he had good control of his car (T.
at 55).

Returning to Officer Prince's narration:
[F]inally there was a big
cloud of smoke--dark blue smoke, and he
stopped his vehicle. We had a roadblock
about ~mile up on the road. And at that
time I thought that maybe he was stopping
for the roadblock. . . .
Officer Penrod exited his car, using
his door as cover.
I positioned my car to
the left rear of Officer Penrod's car.
I exited my car using my door as cover.
we ordered the subject out of the car,
which he did.
And he was standing there
with the--a weapon in his hand, waving it
with the barrel down.
And Officer Penrod
told him several times to put it down.
And at one time he said:
"Put the gun down
and don't do anything stupid." And finally
he did put the gun down.
Officer Penrod
and Sheriff Passic came up and subdued the
subject.
And I came up and I grabbed the
weapon at that time.

(T.

at 34).
Despite the fact that a blood test given at

3:00 a.m. indicated a blood-alcohol content of .24 (T. at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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42 and 44), all of the officers noted that appellant
walked and talked normally (T. at 39,53, and 60).
Officer Prince stated that his movement and speech
were not characteristic of one who was under the
influence of alcohol (T. at 46).

He could not smell

alcohol and did not suspect that this was a case of
driving under the influence of alcohol (T. at 42, 44).
Officer Prince said that, given the excitement of the
chase appellant seemed fairly normal (T. at 39).

Officer

Penrod's testimony paralleled that of Officer Prince and
he also noted that appellant acted normally and was
not a candidate for a driving under the influence charge
(T. at 53-54).

Officer Vuksinik, who knew appellant as

a bartender at the Elk's Club and had seen him quite often,
noted that appellant's speech was normal and that he
"carried himself fine."

(T. at 60).

Officer Vuksinik did

not feel that a driving under the influence charge would
have been appropriate (T. at 59).
After appellant had been placed into a police
car, he overheard Officer Vuksinik commenting about
running out of gas.

He said, "what's the matter, Vuksinik?

Did you run out of gas?"

He then laughed (T. at 54 and 59).

In his own defense, appellant testified that
he had been hit on the head with a small bat in 1974
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which had left a scar on the left side of his head (T.
at 68).

He said that he had been taking medication

for gout every day and had been drinking a blended
whiskey after work on February 21, 1978 (T. at 69).
He noted that he was drinking what he always drank
(~.

at 69-70).

Although he had had that medication

and liquor before at the same time, he clained to
have never had problems before (T. at 78-79).

He

stated that he remembered drinking about five drinks
until about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. and nothing thereafter
until he awakened in jail (T. at 70-71).
Dr. Lincoln Clark, a psychiatrist, testified
at length about the potential effects of the scar on
appellant'shead, the drinks, and the medication.

He

hypothesized that appellant was experiencing a seizure
which left him in a dream-like state, able to walk and
talk normally but not able to consciously direct his
actions (T. at 92).

Dr. Clark did note that his opinion

was not conclusive or the only possible explanation for
appellant's actions.

He said:

I'm simply trying to make sense
out of-what, to me, was a very puzzling
event in this man's life, as to why this
thing happened; and to try and determine
what it was related to.
(T.

at 105).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Dick Foster testified for the state in rebuttal
that he had met with appellant in the evening of February
21st and that appellant, Mr. Foster and his wife had
been drinking beer and tequila (T. at 115), but that
he did not believe appellant was intoxicated (T. at 113).
Mr. Foster said that appellant had been "coming on" to
his wife all evening and that he took them to his house
to "see his puppies,"

(T. at 113).

When Mr. Foster

refused to go into appellant's house, appellant said
"okay" and ran in by himself.

Mr. and Mrs. Foster,

suspecting trouble, ran away.

As they ran they heard

appellant come back out and gun shots ·(T. at 114).

Mr.

Foster said he thought appellant's actions were strange
in that he was acting as he was towards Mrs. Foster
(T.

at 115).
After hearing the evidence, the jury deliberated

and returned a verdict of guilty on the charges of
aggravated robbery and failure to stop at the command
of a police officer and not guilty on the charge of
aggravated assault (R. at 60-62).

Following a presentence

investigation by the State Department of Adult Probation
and Parole, appellant was sentenced to a term of five years
to life in the Utah State Prison and a fine of $2,000.
Execution of the prison sentence and payment of $1,500 of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the fine were suspended and appellant was placed upon
probation with the following terms:
1.

That appellant would pay the $500 fine within

2.

That appellant serve thirty days, on

90 days:

weekends, in the Carbon County Jail;
3.

That appellant remain in present treatment

with Dr. Lincoln Clark and enter alcohol therapy as
designated by Adult Probation and Parole;
4.

That appellant submit to a breathalyzer

test at the discretion of Adult Probation and Parole
within reasonable circumstances and hours;
5.

That appellant totally abstain from the

use of alcoholic beverages; and

6.

That appellant pay $100.00 restitution to

the Price City Police Department for damages to the
patrol car.
Appellant was also given a sentence of six
months in the Carbon County Jail, to be served concurrently
with the prison sentence, which was also suspended and
probation imposed upon the same terms and conditions
(R.

at 85,86).
On April 27, 1979, the Price City Police receivec

a call which indicated a possible assault with a firearm
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(H. at 28-29).

Officer Larry Penrod responded and found

Ms. Lucille Begay barefoot wearing just pajamas and a
nightgown, standing in the driveway at 345 South 100
East in Price (T. at 27,29).

She told Officer Penrod

that, at appellant's invitation, she was living in
his house.

She said that he had beaten her, thrown her

out of the house, and threatened her with a gun (H. at
29).

She said that she wanted to retrieve her clothes

and other property (H. at 2,47).
Fearing that additional help might be needed
because of the possibility that appellant was armed,
several other police officers were summoned (H. at 30,
40 and 46).

The officers realized that appellant was on

probation and summoned probation agents Troth and Reid
(H. at 4).

In an attempt to retrieve Ms. Begay's property

(H. at 29 and 47), the officers knocked on the door of
appellant's house and no one answered (H. at 30).

Ms.

Begay then opened the unlocked door and led them to
appellant's bedroom (H. at 5,6,13 and 30).

Agent Reid

knocked on the locked bedroom door, identifying himself
and asking to talk to appellant (H. at 6,30,41 and 48).
There was no threatening

language used (H. at 41).

Suddenly, appellant opened the bedroom door and grabbed
Agent Reid.

Officer Christensen of the Carbon County

Sheriff's Office pulled appellant off but not before he
tore by
Agent
Reid's
shirt
(H.digitization
at 6,30,42
and of49).
Deputy
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
provided by the Institute
Museum and
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Christensen noted that there was a strong odor of
alcohol about appellant (H. at 50).

Agent Reid asked

appellant to submit to a breathalyzer test, which he
refused to do (H. at 8,9,31 and 50).

One of the

officers noted that appellant sounded quite upset,
that his voice level was rising and that he was, at
times, screaming (H. at 43).

Eventually he threw a

drawer full of Ms. Begay's clothes out into the living
room (H. at 9 and 34).
Appellant testified that he had put Ms. Begay
out of the house because she had been drinking and
acting violently (H. at 56-57).

He said she was staying

in his house while looking for a job (H. at 54-55).
He admitted having a struggle with Agent Reid but said
that he did so after his bedroom door had been thrown
open and light had been shown in his face

(H. at 53).

After hearing the testimony, the Court felt that
Ms. Begay had demonstrated enough of an interest to admit
the officers to the house

(H. at 63).

that appellant had been shO\m to have

The Court ruled
viola~ed

his probat,:

by acting violently toward Agent Reid, drinking alcohol,
and refusing to submit to a
what was,
time

brect~halyzer

examination at

in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable

(H. at 64-66).

Appellant's probation was revoked

he was committed to theUtahState Prison (H. at 66-67).
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a~,:

ARGUHENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF REDUCED
CAPACITY OR INTOXICATION IS NOT
SO OVERWHELMING AS TO COMPEL
A REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT'S
GUILT.
In State in Interest of R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333
(Utah 1979), this Court restated the rule of review with
respect to a jury verdict challenged on the basis of
insufficient evidence.

Citing State v. Mills, 530 P.2d

1272 (Utah 1975), the Court stated:
It is the prerogative of the jury to
judge the weight of the evidence, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the
facts to be found therefrom. For a
defendant to prevail upon a·challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his conviction, it must appear that
viewing the evidence and all inferences that
may reasonbly be drawn therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury, reasonable minds could not believe
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
To
set aside a verdict it must appear that
the evidence was so inconclusive or
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting
fairly must have entertained reasonable
doubt that defendant committed the crime.
Unless the evidence compels such conclusion
as a matter of law, the verdict must be
sustained.
Id. at 1272.
In this matter the only issue raised by appellant
concerns whether or not the jury was correct in finding
that he had the requisite intent to commit the crimes
charged (see Appellant's Brief, p. 8).

It is well
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. specific intent may be
proved by circumstantial, as well as
direct, evidence,. and that it may be
inferred from the acts and conduct of
the accused, the nature of the weapon
used by defendant and manner in which
it was used, taken together with all
the other circumstances in the case.
As to whether or not the specific
intent existed in the mind of the accused
is a question of fact to be submitted to
and determined by the jury from all the
evidence in the case and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom, and is not a
matter of legal presumption.
State v. Minousis, 64 Utah at 206, 211-212, 228 Pac.
574 (1924).

See also State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392

P. 2d 486 at 488

(1964).

Appellant contends that the presence of the
specific intent to commit aggravated robbery was negated
by evidence of insanity and/or intoxication.

Neverthe-

less, evidence tending to demonstrate either or both of
those defenses presented at trial does not compel a
reasonable person to conclude that the jury was mistaken
in finding appellant guilty of aggravated robbery.
REDUCED CAPACITY
Appellant raises, for the first time, the defenS'
of insanity under Utah Code Ann.
amended.

§

76-2-305 (1953), as

The record is devoid of any notice, prior to

trial, of an intent to use the insanity defense as
required by Utah Code Ann.

§

77-22-16 (1953), as amended.

Given the absence of the required notice or any discuss~:
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of good cause for permitting evidence indicating
insanity, it must be assumed that any evidence which
might demonstrate insanity was presented and considered
in connection with the defense of voluntary intoxication
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1953), as amended.

This

is especially true in this matter where the evidence of
reduced capacity was particularly aimed at demonstrating
the effect of alcohol and/or drugs upon appellant.

It

would be improper to consider the defense of reduced
capacity under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1953), as
amended, as raised at this time.

To do so would defeat

the purpose of the notice requirement of Utah Code Ann.
§

77-22-16 (1953), as amended, since the State would be

effectively prevented from countering such a defense with
affirmative evidence.
Nevertheless, even if it is assumed, for the
sake of argument, that the defense of reduced capacity
or insanity under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 was raised
in a timely manner and should now be considered, appellant's
evidence on the point does not compel this Court to set
aside the jury's determination of guilt.
It is well settled in Utah that once evidence
is introduced which raises the issue of the defendant's
sanity, the presumption of sanity disappears and the
matter of the defendant's ability to form any necessary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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criminal intent becomes a jury question.
78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d at 177 at 182 (1932).

State v. Green,
See also

State v. Dominguez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977).
In State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641
a jury verdict of guilt was reversed because it was
apparent that the jury had disregarded overwhelming
evidence of insanity which had been left unrebutted by
the prosecution.

The Court said:

At the trial the defendant made no
attempt to deny or explain the acts
charged as constituting the offense,
but relied solely upon the defense of
insanity, while the state relied entirely
upon proof of the acts charged, without
in any way attempting to rebut or explain
the evidence of insanity submitted on
behalf of the defendant.
Id. at 642.
The Court did, however, note that:
There, no doubt, may be instances
where the evidence offered by the
defendant upon the question of his sanity
is so weak and inconclusive that the state
may well insist upon the presumption of
sanity, and thus need not offer any
evidence in rebuttal of defendant's
evidence upon the question.
Id. at 644.
Finally, the Court said:
If the state of the evidence upon the
issue of insanity had been such as to permit
reasonable men to arrive at different
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conclusions when considered in connection
with the presumption of sanity, then the
question would be one of fact merely, and
we would be powerless to interfere.
Id. at 646.
In State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 Pac. 940
(1925), a jury verdict of guilt in the face of evidence
of insanity was upheld.

The Court noted that the evidence

was not so overwhelming as in earlier cases and said:
The question of the sanity or insanity
of any one accused of the commission of a
crime is a question of fact primarily for
the jury to determine. Courts should not
set aside a jury's verdict, unless it
appears from the whole record that the
jury, without reason and in disregard of the
uncontradicted testimony, rendered its
verdict contrary to such testimony.
Id. at 842.
Still later, in State v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 109,
449 P.2d 119 (1969), the defendant claimed that a jury
verdict of guilt should have been reversed because the
testimony of two psychiatrists to the effect that he
was not responsible for his actions in killing an exgirlfriend went unrebutted by any expert testimony.

The

court first restated State v. Hadley, supra, and then,
citing Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 754-757
(8th Cir. 1961), stated:
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This and other courts have said that
expert opinion as to insanity rises no
higher than the reasons upon which it is
based, that it is not binding upon the
trier of facts, and that lay testimony can qe
sufficient to satisfy the prosecutions'
burden even though there is expert testimony
to the contrary. .
(citations omitted).
There is nothing essentially sacred or
untouchable in expert testimony. The mere
fact that the primary evidence on one side
may be typified as expert in character while
that on the other is exclusively from the
mouths of lay witnesses and from lay facts
must not of itself serve to destroy the
jury's traditional function.
State v. Holt, supra, 449 P.2d at 120-121.
The Court then cited People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 394P.:
959 at 964-965 (1964):
In People v. Wolff, four psychiatrists
testified that the defendant was insane;
the court stated:
* * * It is only in the rare case when
"the evidence is uncontradicted and entirely
to the effect that the accused is insance"
[citation omitted) that a unanimity of
expert testimony could authorize upsetting
a jury finding to the contrary. While the
jury may not draw inferences inconsistent
with incontestably established ~s2ts
[citation omitted), neverthcol.ess '_f there
is substantial evidence fro~ wh~~. the
jury could infer that the defendant was
legally sane at the time of the offense
such a finding must be sustained in the face
of conflicting evidence, expert or otherwise,
for the question of weighing that evidence
and resolving that conflict "is a question
of fact for the jury's determination"
[citation omitted). * * *
* * * it is settled that "the conduct
and declarations of the defendant occurring
within a reasonable time before or after the
commission of the alleged act arc admissible
in proof of his mental condition at the time cf
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State v. Holt, supra at 121.

The Court cited further:

. • . To hold otherwise would be in
effect to substitute a trial by "experts"
for a trial by jury, for it would require
that the jurors accept th~psychiatric
testimony as conclusive on an issue--the
legal sanity of the defendant--which under
our present law is exclusively within the
province of the trier of fact to determine.
To guard against misunderstanding of
.
our rules it is pertinent to observe that we
do not reject expert testimony simply or
solely because it may also answer the ultimate
question the jury is called upon to decide
(citation omitted); but, strictly speaking,
a psychiatrist is not an "expert" at all
when it comes to determining whether the
defendant is legally responsible • •
Id. at 122 (emphasis in original).

The court then held:

In the instant action . . . the testimony
respecting the insanity of the appellant is
not so positive or conclusive that it can be
said as matter of law that the jury, in
returning a verdict of guilty, acted
arbitrarily or failed to give consideration
and regard to the evidence in the case.
Id. at 122.
The position of this Court as stated in State v.
Holt, supra, is consistent with the weight of authority from
other jurisdictions.

See State v. Cano, 103 Ariz. 37,

436 P.2d 586, 590 (1968); Griswell v. State, 443 P.2d 552,
555, 556 (Nev. 1968); Gonzales v. State, 388 P.2d 312, 317
(Okla. Crim. 1964); United States v. Coleman, 501 F.2d
342 at 346 (lOth Cir. 1974); United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d
250 at 250-252 (1st Cir. 1975); and People v. Lowe, 184
co 1. 18 2 , 519 P. 2 d 3 4 4 , 3 4 8 ( 19 7 4 ) •
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In the instant matter there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury determination of guilt.
Appellant's expert witness noted that his opinion was·
not conclusive or the only possible explanation for
appellant's actions (T. at 105).

Virtually every

person involved testified that appellant walked and
talked normally (T. at 10,13,16,19,20,53 and 60).
Appellant had had the scar on his head for four years
(T. at 68).

Drinking along with taking medication was

a regular occurrence (T. at 69-70).

He recognized

Officer Vuksinik (T. at 54, 59), and was able to drive
horne with the Fosters after drinking at several bars
(T. at 113-115).

Dr. Clark's testimony that with the

right combination of alcohol and medication appellant
could believe he was back in Viet Narn looking for "C"
rations is, at best, a tentative suggestion of an
explanation for appellant's behavior.
Reasonable persons could certainly find that
appellant's overall conduct was inconsistent with the
Doctor's theory, and conclude that appellant did, indeed,
know what he was doing.

Respondent does not pretend

that the facts in this matter are not bizarre.

But the

mere fact that appellant asked for toilet paper and
matches instead of something of greater value does not
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compel a finding that appellant did not have the
capacity to form larcenous intent.

Appellant did not

steal anything of great value or cause any great,
tangible harm.

He did, however, terrorize two persons

in their own home as well as jeopardize the lives of a

number of law enforcement personnel.

Why appellant

did what he did is not a question that can be
answered by a court.

The jury did, however, determine

that appellant was capable of intending to do what he
did.

The evidence of Dr. Clark is not so compelling

that the evidence from which intent and capacity may be
inferred so weak that a reasonable person is compelled
to determine that appellant lacked the capacity to direct
his actions.

Consequently, the verdict of the jury should

be affirmed.
INTOXICATION
Appellant claims to have negated any possibility of specific intent via proof of voluntary
intoxication in accordance with Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-306 (1953), as amended, which provides that voluntary
intoxication is a defense when "such intoxication negates
the existence of the mental state which is an element of
the offense."

Where the charge is aggravated robbery

under Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-302 (1953), as amended, the
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actor must unlawfully and intentionally take personal
property from the victim.

Reading the two statutes

together, in order for a person to have a defense to
aggravated robbery, he must be so intoxicated that
he is unable to intend to unlawfully take property from
another.

Mere evidence which indicates some degree of

intoxication does not, by itself, establish a defense.
The intoxication must be to the extent that it negates
the requisite mental state.

In Rice v. State, 500 P.2d

675 (Mont. 1972), the Court stated:
. [T]he understanding of one
who has been drinking must be determined
on the facts of each particular case.
In Rice's case, it was for the jury to
decide whether his drinking had rendered
him insane • .
If the defendant is to stand on a
claim that he, because of drunkenness, could
not have intended the consequences of his
acts, that fact would first have to be proven
to the jury.
. To claim insanity on account
of drunkeness is equivalent to claiming the
absence of intent on account of drunkeness.
The question is clearly a jury question.
Id. at 676, 677.
In Griggs v. Cowmonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 475 (Va.
1979), the defendant was charged with robbing a bank and
claimed amnesia and a lack of intent due to a toxically
based organic brain syndrome induced from the use of
drugs.

The Court held:
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We believe that it was for the
jury to decide whether the defendant
acted with criminal intent in the
corrunission of the crimes.- v<hile the
Corrunonwealth may not have produced
"concrete evidence" of intent, such
a failure is not unusual; of
necessity, intent often is established
by circumstantial evidence. There
was abundant circumstantial evidence
before the jury from which it could
have inferred criminal intent.
Id. at 4 78.
Finally, in State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 196 S.E.2d
777, 788

(1973), it was noted that the intoxication

required to make a person guilty of driving under the
influence and the level of intoxication required to
negate criminal intent was not congruent.
In the instant matter, while there was
evidence of intoxication, there was also evidence from
which it could be inferred that appellant was not so
intoxicated that he could not have intended to corrunit the
crime of aggravated robbery.

None of the police officers

who testified felt that appellant was intoxicated (T. at 42,
44,46,53-54,59-60).

Appellant was able to walk, talk,

and drive normally (T. at 12-13,19-20,46,49,39,53 and 60).
He recognized acquaintances(T. at 54 and 59).

His voice

was the same on the evening in question as it was later
at a casual setting in a bank (T. at 20-21).

Mrs.

Johnston stated that although she thought appellant had
takenby thesomething
or was
drugs,
she
that
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primarily because of what he asked for, not because of
the way he acted or talked (T. at 26 and 28).

The

psychiatrist's speculative explanation was only offered
as one possible reason for appellant's actions (T. at
105).

Again, why appellant acted as he did was not

before the Court.

The jury's function was to determine

that appellant was able to intend to act as he did.
The mere fact that he had been drinking and was, in
fact,

intoxicated to the point that under the laws of

this State he was driving unlawfully (T. at 42 and 44),
does not establish a lack of ability to form the
requisite criminal intent to commit aggravated robbery.
There was ample evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that appellant knew and intended the
consequences of his act.

The jury verdict must be

affirmed.
Several additional cases are instructive in
this matter.
N.W. 2d 684
robbery.

In People v. Fisk, 62 Mich.App.

638, 233

(1975), the defendant was convicted of armed

Two psychiatrists testified that the defendant

suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder and from
alcoholic psychosis and that alcohol intake caused him to
lose the willpower to resist the impulse to commit the
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crime.

The prosecution offered no expert witnesses in

rebuttal.

The court noted that "the prospect of sending

a man who has obvious emotional problems to prison for
twenty to forty years prompts this Court to examine
carefully the findings of fact and conclusions of law."
Id. at 686.

The Court then stated:

"The ultimate

determination of sanity and the existence of specific
intent rests with the trier of fact, whether court or
jury."

Id. at 686.

The Court held that there was not

sufficient evidence of reduced capacity to overturn the
jury verdict of guilt and affirmed the verdict.
In United States v. Williams, 332 F.Supp. 1
(D. Maryland, 1971), the defendant was charged with
robbing a bank.

The evidence in the case indicated that

the defendant had been drinking whiskey and had taken
6 or 7 "yellow jackets" or barbiturate pills.
also taken LSD pills.

He had

Witnesses said that he smelled

strongly of liquor and had been drinking but did not seem
drunk.

His speech was heavy and he did not seem to

walk normally.

A psychiatrist testified that the

defendant V.'as unable to control his actions when so
intoxicated.

Another psychiatric witness for the

government testified that while the defendant could have
controlled his actions if not intoxicated, defendant was
a passive dependent type and had a condition something
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short of total mental health.

The Court cited Heideman

v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 128, 259 F.2d 943
at 946 (1958), wherein then Circuit Judge Burger

stat~d:

"Drunkenness, while efficient to reduce or remove
inhibitions, does not readily negate intent."

The

Court in United States v. \villiarns then held:
. • . [T)hat the defendant had taken
alcohol and drugs to the point of being
"under the influence" but that he was not
so intoxicated as not to understand what
he was doing or to not have the intention
to steal from the bank. There is a marked
difference between the accounts of the
persons who observed defendant and defendant's
own account as to his condition.
It appears
from a witness called by the defense that he
was able to write a "stickup" note shortly
before the robbery, to go into the bank, hold
a coherent conversation about a loan, present
the note, obtain over $4,000 in cash, none of
which has been returned, and make good his
escape.
The Court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the intent to stea:1
from the bank as required for conviction . • . .
Id. at 7.
Finally, in People v. Bacon, 293 Ill. 210, 127
N.E. 386 (1920), a retired policeman who was employed as a
security guard was charged with the murder of a close frie~:
The defendant had been wounded at one time with two

bulle~'

in the brain and, according to expert testimony, suffered
intervals of unconsciousness during which he was not
responsible for his actions.

Apparently, he had encounte

his friend in a bar where they had had a few beers.
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for no reason.

Upon being told later of his action

the defendant said, "You are crazy; I did not shoot
him; he was one of the best friends I had in the
world; I would not hurt a hair on his head."

The

court held:
While the circumstances surrounding
this shooting are strange, and while it
is difficult to account for the conduct
of plaintiff in error, it is clear that
there was in the record undisputed evidence
which justified the verdict of the jury • .
This court will not interfere with a verdict
of guilty except when this court is able to
say, from a careful consideration of the
whole testimony, that there is clearly a
reasonable and well-founded doubt of the
guilt of the accused.
Id. at 388.
There is no question but that the circumstances
in the instant matter are also strange.
evidence of

intoxication~

There was also

Nevertheless, the jury listened

to the witnesses and determined that appellant was not
so intoxicated that he was unable to form the requisite
criminal intent.

Many crimes are senseless.

Hopefully,

one could say that anyone who specifically intends to
commit a criminal act of violence is not "normal."
such persons are held responsible for their conduct.

Still,
It

is when they cannot intend the consequences of their
conduct that they are not responsible for their actions.
It would be a miscarriage of justice to reverse the
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jury's determination of guilt because it is difficult to
determine why appellant did what he did.

The jury found

that he intended to do what he did and that he was gui_lty
of aggravated robbery as charged.

That verdict is

reasonable and should be upheld.

/

Finally, appellant argues that the jury finding

'I

of not guilty of aggravated assault, a general intent crime,
is inconsistent with an inference of ability to form the
specific intent necessary for aggravated robbery (Appellant
Brief at p.

38).

Appellant's contention, however, rests

upon several assumptions which are not supportable.

First,

he assumes that the jury found him not guilty of aggravated
assault because they felt that appellant did not intend to!

I
assault Officer Vuksinik with his car.

While that may

be true, there is no way to determine that fact from the
verdict of the jury.

It is virtually impossible to tell

why the jury determined that appellant was not guilty of
aggravated assault.

They may have felt that he was guilh

of all the offenses but should only be punished for some
of the offenses.
A second assumption upon which appellant must
rest his contention is that if the jury found appellant
not guilty of aggravated assault because he had no intent
to assault Officer Vuksinik, he lacked the intent becaus:
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he lacked the capacity to form the intent.
clearly not supportable.

This is

The jury may simply have

believed that appellant did not intend to run into
Officer Vuksinik with his car.

Such an action would

have ended any chance he had to escape.

Perhaps the jury

simply felt that an intent to assault Officer Vuksinik
was inconsistent with his vigorous attempt to escape the
pursuing police cars.

Clearly, it need not be assumed

that because the jury found appellant not guilty of
aggravated assault, they could only have consistently
returned a verdict of "not guilty" on the aggravated
robbery charge as well.
In summary, the verdict of the jury should only
be discarded if the evidence compels a reasonable doubt as
to the guilt of appellant.

Evidence of intent may be

inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case and
testimony of an expert with respect to the lack of capacity
to form intent need not be countered by additional expert
Indeed, to apply such a rule in this case would

testimony.

be unjust since there was no notice of any intent to claim
reduced capacity prior to the trial as required by Utah
Code Ann.

§

77-22-16 (1953), as amended.

There were

sufficient facts in this matter to support the jury's
conclusion that appellant was neither insane nor
lntoxicated to the point of irresponsibility.

The verdict

by the should
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POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY.
~

Appellant contends that the lower court erred
the instant matter in instructing the jury.

He complains

that the jury was improperly instructed with respect to the
State's burden of proof on the question of intent and as
to the weight to be given evidence of intoxication in
determining the existence of the requisite intent
(Appellant's Brief, Point II).

Nevertheless, if all of

the instructions are read together and placed in context,
it is readily apparent that there was no error in the
instructions given.
It is well established that jury instructions
should be considered as a whole and "not considered in
isolation in order to predicate a claim or error."
Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 at 577
(1966).

See also State v. Coffey, 564 P. 2d 777 at 779

1977), and State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56 at 57

(~:'

I

I

(Utah 1978).

Taking all of the instructions together, it is
clear that the jury in the instant matter was properly
instructed on the State's burden of proof on the questior.
of intent.

Appellant was charged with the commission of

three crimes:

aggravated robbery, failure to stop a vet:.:

at the command of a police officer, and aggravated assaui"
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1

(R. at 17,18).

In Instruction llwnber 2, the court told

the jury that appellant's not guilty plea denied all of
the essential allegations of the information and "casts
upon the state the burden of proving each and all of the
essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction and
beyond a reasonable doubt"

(R. at 19).

crimes charged was then explained.

Each of the

One of the material

elements of aggravated robbery was:
That the defendant on or about
February 22, 1978 unlawfully and
intentionally took personal property
from the possession of Von W. Johnston.
(R. at 20, emphasis added.)

A material element of the

charge of failure to stop a vehicle at the command of
a police officer was:

"That the defendant continued to

operate his vehicle in willful or wanton di§reqard of such
signal."

(R. at 21, emphasis added.)

No specific intent

requirement was outlined for the crime of aggravated
assault (R. at 22).

In each of instructions 3, 4 and 5,

outlining the material elements of the crimes charged,
the jury was also told that:
If.
. the State has failed to prove
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt either of the foregoing propositions
. or if you entertain a reasonable doubt,
then it is your duty to acquit the defendant.
(R. at 20, 21 and 22).
The jury was additionally instructed in
Instruction Number 6 that:
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No person is guilty of an offense
unless his conduct is prohibited by law
and he acts intentionally or knowingly
with respect to each element of the
offense as defined for you by these
instructions.
It does not require a
specific intent to violate the law but
merely an intent to engage in the acts
or conduct that constitute the elements
of the offense.
Therefore, if you find that the
mental conditions of the defendant at the
times of the alleged offenses was such
that he did not have the intent as that
term has been defined for you in these
instructions to perform the acts or conduct
required for the commission of the offense
charged, or if you entertain a reasonable
doubt thereof, then you should find the
defendant not guilty of the crimes charged.
(R. at 23, emphasis added.)
"Intentionally" was defined in Instruction
Number 7 as when an actor has a "conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result"
(R.

at 24).

"Willful," although not defined in the

instructions is a word commonly understood and is defined
as intentional.

See Webster's New International

Dictionary, 2d Ed., Unabridged.

See also Brunson v.

Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 and 452-453

(1966),

where this Court noted that jury instructions "should be
read in their entire context and given meaning in

accorda~

with the ordinary and usual import of the language. . · ·"
Although appellant contends that Instruction

Nur:/

6 misstates the law, he is mistaken (see Appellant's Bne:f
p.the S.J.
48).
AsLibrary.
theFunding
specific
crimes
are andstated
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the

Utah Code and as they were explained to the jury, the
"specific intent" required is clearly nothing more than
that appellant consciously intended the result of his
actions.

See LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law,

1972, at 196.

In the case of aggravated robbery, appellant

must have wanted or consciously desired to "take personal
property in the possession of another .
force or fear"
amended) .

. by means of

(Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as

For failure to stop a vehicle at the command

of a police officer appellant must have consciously ignored
a signal or command from a police officer to stop his
vehicle (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10 1 repealed 1978).
Instruction Number 6 is correct when it states that
appellant had the necessary intent if he had the "intent
to engage in the acts or conduct that constitutes the
elements of the offense."
Clearly, in the instant matter, the jury was
instructed that the state had the burden to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the specific intent required for the
crimes of aggravated robbery and failure to stop a vehicle
at the command of a police officer.

As appellant notes,

no specific intent is required to establish the crime of
aggravated assault (Appellant's Brief at p. 38).

Moreover,

they were told that if they had a reasonable doubt of
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appellant's mental ability to possess the required intent
then they were to find appellant not guilty.
Appellant also questions the instruction on
voluntary intoxication, Instruction Number 8.

That

instruction provided:
Our law provides that "no act committed
by a person while in a state of voluntary
intoxication is less criminal by reason of
his having been in such condition." This
means that such a condition, if shown by the
evidence to have existed in the defendant at
the time when allegedly he committed the
crime charged, is not of itself a defense.
It may throw light on the occurrence and
aid you in determining what took place; but
when a person in a state of intoxication,
voluntarily produced in himself, commits a
crime, the law does not permit him to use his
own vice as a shelter against the normal,
legal consequences of his conduct.
However, when the existence of any
particular motive, purpose or intent is a
necessary element to constitute a particular
kind or degree of crime the jury, in
determining whether or not such motive, purpose
or intent existed in the mind of the accused,
must take into consideration the evidence
offered to prove that the accused was
~ntoxicated at the time when the crime
allegedly was committed.
This fact requires an inquiry into the
state of mind under which the defendant
committed the act charged, if he did commit
it.
In pursing that inquiry, it is proper to
consider whether he was intoxicated at the t~e
of the alleged offense. The weight to be giv~
on Lhat question and the significance to attach
to it, in relation to all the other evidence, arE
exclusively within your province.
(R. at 25, emphasis added.)
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In evaluating Instruction Number 8, it is
important to remember that, although appellant \vas
convicted of two specific intent crimes, he was
charged with three crimes, one of which did not
have a particular state of mind as a material element.
It is clear, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1953),
as amended, that "(vpluntary intoxication is no defense
to a criminal charge."

In the normal situation, where

no specific intent need be established as a material
element of the crime charged, evidence of voluntary
intoxication is irrelevant and should be disregarded.
When, however, the State is bound to establish that a
particular mental state existed, evidence of voluntary
intoxication becomes relevant but only as it pertains
to the presence of the requisite mental state.

Proof of

intoxication, of whatever degree, does not mandate a
finding of no intent and not guilty.

Voluntary

intoxication is never an absolute defense in the sense
that establishment of voluntary intoxication precludes
guilt.

Such evidence must be weighed, along with all

other evidence to determine if the material intent
el~ent

was established.

Only if the intoxication was

of such a degree or nature that the defendant was precluded
from forming the necessary intent must a not guilty verdict
be returned.
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Instruction Number 8 correctly stated the
law.

Where both crimes requiring proof of a particular

intent and crimes not requiring such proof are charged,
the court must instruct as to the effect and weight to
be given evidence of voluntary intoxication in both
situations.

By giving both explanations together in

one instruction, the court makes it clear that there is
a difference and that one situation is an exception.
There is much greater potential for confusion where
one instruction explains the law for specific intent
crimes and another gives the general rule.

The court

had already made clear the material eleQents of the
crimes charged, including the fact that a particular
intent was material to two of the three.

There was no

need for further reference to those particular mental
states and, indeed, such a reference may have unduly
emphasized appellant's case.

Instruction Number 8

correctly stated the law and was not error.
Although it is true, as noted by appellant,
that instructions framed within the facts of the case
are helpful to the jury and better than abstract
explanations of the law in most cases, the court did
not err in this matter.

Each of the crimes charged

was explained carefully and concretely within the facts
of the case (Instruction Numbers 3, 4 and 5).

As has
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already been noted, the relevance of voluntary
intoxication to each crime differed.

A general

description of the law of voluntary intoxication,·
easily applicable to each of the other, more concrete
explanations,was proper and less confusing than
separate, differing explanations would have been.
The gist of appellant's claim seems to be
that the court did not emphasize his theory of reduced
intent due to the combined effects of alcohol, medication,
and brain disorder.

There was no need for the court to

summarize appellant's defense in the instructions.

There

was never any contention that appellant would have done
what he did without having ingested, voluntarily, alcohol
and medication.

The jury was told to consider evidence

of intoxication in determining the presense of the
requisite mental intent.

There was no indication that

appellant had taken any unusual medication or had
anything to drink which he had not had with his medication
before.

Rather, the evidence indicated that he was

drinking what he always drank and that he had been
taking medication daily for some time (T. at 69-70,
78-79).

It certainly is not the law that one who

becomes more intoxicated than he wanted to through voluntary
ingestion of drugs or alcohol has a defense on that basis.
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Appellant's proposed instructions on involuntary
intoxication were not supported by the evidence. What
there was to appellant's defense was covered by the
instructions on mental capacity and voluntary intoxication.

Significantly, these instructions placed at least

as great a burden upon the State, if not greater than would
appellant's proposed Instruction Number 4 where appellant
noted that:
Should you find that defendant
was under involuntary intoxication to the
extent that there was no functioning of
the conscious mind at the time of the
alleged criminal acts, you must find the
defendant not guilty.
If the jury had found appellant to be so intoxicated
for any reason as to have no functioning of the conscious
mind they would have been bound to find appellant not
guilty of aggravated robbery and failure to stop at the
command of a police officer under Instruction Numbers
3, 4,

6 and 7.
In summary, the necessity of proof of intent

and consideration of evidence indicating a lack of
capacity to prove such an intent were both properly
presented to the jury.

The elements of the offenses

charged were concretely presented with reference to the
facts of the case and the jury was specifically told that
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the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant acted intentionally in committing the
acts constituting the crimes of aggravated robbery ano
failure to stop at the command of a police officer.
Appellant's theory was adequately presented through the
instructions on reduced capacity, requisite intent, and
voluntary intoxication.

The court did not err and the

jury verdict should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE VERDICT OF GUILT ON THE CHARGE
OF FAILURE TO STOP A VEHICLE AT THE
COMMAND OF A POLICE OFFICER IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
While it is true that an element of the crime
for failure to stop a vehicle at the command of a police
officer, as stated in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-169.10, as
repealed 1978, is that the actor acted "wilfully" or
intentionally, that element was fully and completely
explained to the jury (see Point II, supra), and there was
ample evidence from which they could infer that essential
element (see Point I, supra).

Neither was appellant's

evidence of reduced capacity so overwhelming or compelling
as to mandate a not guilty verdict.

As was explained more

completely in Point I, specific intent may be inferred
from the acts and conduct of the accused.
supra, and other cases as cited in Point I.

State v. Minousis,
In the instant
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lucid and in control of his faculties at all times
during the night in question.

He walked and talked

normally (T. at 12,13,16,19,20,37,53, and 60).

He

recognized Officer Vuksinik as an acquaintance (T. at
54 and 59).

Appellant was in full control of his

car during an extended high speed chase (T. at 33-34,46,
49 and 55) during which it appeared as if he fired a
weapon at the pursuing officers (T. at 49).
It is clear that although once a defendant rais91
the question of insanity any presumption of insanity
disappears, the question of the defendant's ability to
form the requisite intent then becomes a jury question.
Horeover,

~he

issue of voluntary intoxication as a

defense is also primarily a jury issue since the question
is not whether or not intoxication existed but whether or
not the intoxication, if it existed, acted to negate the
defendant's ability to form the requisite intent.

(See

Points I and II for extended discussion of these issues.)
In this matter there was enough evidence to support the
reasonable view that appellant knew what he was doing whee
he robbed the Johnstons and led the police on a dangerous,
high speed chase.

The verdict of the jury should only be

overturned when a reasonable doubt is compelled (see
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v. Hills, supra) which is not the case here.
of the psychiatrist was tentative at best.

The testimony
The weight

to be given the testimony of experts, even when uncontradicted
by additional expert testimony, is for the jury (see State
v. Holt, supra).

The verdict of the jury was proper and

should be affirmed.
POINT IV
REVOCATION OF APPELLNiT'S PROBATION
\'lAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
When appellant was placed on probation following
conviction, he was directed to "submit to a breahalyzer
test at the discretion of the Adult Probation and Parole
Departr.lent within reasonable circumstances and hours;"
and to "totally abstain from the use of alcohol beverages"
(R. at 85).

Horeover, he agreed to "be of good behavior"

(R. at 87).

The Court revoked his probation on the ground

that appellant had acted violently toward his probation
officer and had refused a reasonable request to take a
breathalyzer test (R. at 83, H. at 66).
The Court's conclusions were supported by the
evidence introduced at the Show Cause for Revocation Hearing
on Hay 23, 1979.

Police officers received a report that a

barefoot woman in pajamas and nightgown was beating on a
door around midnight screaming that someone was trying to
kill her

(H. at 28-29).

She told the officers that she
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threatened her, and had thrown her out of the house (H.
at 29).

She expressed a desire to retrieve her property

from appellant's house (H. at 29 and 47).
The officers knocked on the door of appellant's
house and got no response (H. at 30).

The young woman

then opened the door and led the officers to appellant's
room (H. at 5,6,13, and 30).

Appellant's probation super-

visor, Agent Reid, knocked on the locked bedroom door
and identified himself while politely asking to talk
(H. at 6,30,41 and 48).

Without warning, appellant

opened his bedroom door and grabbed Agent Reid.

Appellant

was restrained by Sheriff's Deputy Christensen but
not before he tore Agent Reid's shirt (H. at 6,30,42 and

4~~

Deputy Christensen noted a strong odor of alcohol about
appellant (H. at SO).

/

Faced with a report of drinking and 1

violence and the fact of appellant's violent reaction and I

I

hysterical behavior (H. at 43), Agent Reid requested that
appellant submit to a breathalyzer test.

Appellant

refused to take the test (H. at 8,9,31 and 50).

Appellant

admitted the struggle with Agent Reid (H. at 53) and
remembered the request to take a breathalyzer test (H.
53).

He also noted that the woman had clothes in his

room in a drawer which he eventually threw into the
living room (H. at 54).
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c.

The evidence clearly indicates that appellant
engaged in violent behavior with respect to Agent Reid.
His refusal to take a breathalyzer test was also shown by
uncontradicted evidence.

Appellant does not now contend

that these matters were shown.

Nor does he contend that

the terms of his probation were unreasonable.

Rather,

he argues that the actions of the officers in entering
his horne and requesting a breathalyzer exam were
improper and unreasonable (Appellant's Brief at 54-57).
He further argues that the lower court acted unreasonably
in revoking his probation on those grounds (Appellant's
Brief at 64-65).
It is well settled that revocation of probation
is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge.
In Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 at 642
(1944), this Court noted:
The right to suspend imposition of
sentence and the right to place one on
probation is a discretionary right. One
placed upon probation has a right to be
heard as to whether he has violated the
conditions upon which suspended sentence
was based.
. Upon such a hearing,
the trial court has discretionary power to
continue probation or impose sentence, but
to authorize termination of probation there
must be some competent evidence of violation
of the terms of probation. Violation of the
terms and conditions of suspension or probation
is usually a ground for revocation and the
imposition of sentence.
. When it appears
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that a trial judge has exercised
discretion in suspending imposition of
sentence or in revoking probation and
imposing sentence, after a hearing as
heretofore mentioned, the judgment of
the trial court should not be molested.
(Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873 at 874 (1979), and
State v. Knowles,

1

25 Utah 2d 13, 474 P.2d 727 at 728 (1970):

The standard of proof in a revocation hearing

1

is also much lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard employed in criminal trials.
A revocation of probation is an
exercise of broad discretionary power by the
trial court akin to that utilized in imposing
the probated sentence initially.
Evidence
that would establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is not required to support an order revokinc
probation.
Probably evidence rising to the level I
of substantial evidence is not even required,
absent arbitrary and capricious action in the
I
revocation.
All that is required is that the
·
evidence and facts be such as to reasonably
satisfy the judge that the conduct of the
probationer has not been as good as required
by the conditions of probation . • . On review
an action of the trial court revoking probation
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse of discretion.
1

United States v. Francischine, 512 F.2d 827 at 829 (5th
Cir. 1975).

See also United States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 604r

606 (8th Cir. 1978); Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 312
So. 2d 620 at 624 (1975); and People v. 1\Titherspoon, 9 Ill.
App.3d 317, 292 N.E.2d 202 at 203 to 204 (1972).
The evidence in this instance showed at least
two violations of probation without contradiction.

The
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evidence indicated that the.request for a breathalyzer
test was entirely reasonable.

The officers had a report

of drinking and violence and had been directly confronted
by appellant's further aggressive, violent behavior.
smelled of alcohol.

He

He had the clothing of the pajama-

clad woman who complained of his earlier, violent behavior.
The testimony of four officers agreed that appellant
reacted violently to a polite, non-beligerant request to
talk.

The Court's conclusion that appellant violated his

probation by acting violently and refusing a reasonable
request to submit to a breathalyzer test finds clear
support in the evidence.

There is absolutely no showing

of any abuse of discretion and the action of the trial
court should be affirmed.
POINT V
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT
REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF
THE LO\'i'ER COURT TO REVOKE APPELLANT' S
PROBATION.
Appellant contends that the evidence upon
which his probation was revoked was obtained in violation
of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and should not have been
considered by the lower court (Appellant's Brief at p. 58).
The United States Supreme Court has held:
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The test of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application.
In each case it requires a balancing
of the need for the particular search against
the inasion of personal rights that the
search entials.
Courts must consider the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner
in which it is conducted, the justificiation
for initiating it and the place in which it
is conducted.
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 s.ct. 1861 at 1884 (1979).

See also

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 s.ct. 330 at 332 (1977);

~

v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 at 121 (Utah 1976); and State v.
White, 577 P.2d 552 at 553 (Utah 1978).
The "search" in the instant matter was something
less than a full-blown room by room examination of appellan::!
horne.

The officers merely accompanied a woman, clad in

night clothes, into a house she claimed to live in to
question appellant (H. at 5,6,13 and 30).

lvhen confronted

with appellant's locked bedroom door they stopped and
requested appellant to come out and talk (H. at 6,30,41 and
48).

Although the officers testified as to what they saw

in the house, it was clear that the purpose for entering
the house was to confront appellant, retrieve the woman's
property, and to determine if, in fact, appellant had
violated the terms of his probation.

The lower court clea:

based its conclusion that probation had been violated on
actions of appellant in the presence of the officers,
upon any evidence obtained as the result of an illegal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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no~

~

1

Appellant notes that Fourth Amendment requirements where probationers are involved are different
than for the ordinary citizen (Appellant's Brief at
p.

54).

In Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.

1975), the Court compared the privacy interests of a
parolee and the interests and needs of society in seeing
that conditions of parole are met and concluded that it was
not appropriate to require a parole officer to obtain a
warrant (Id. at 250).

The Court stated:

We think that one. . . (restriction)
. necessary to the effective operation
of the parole system, is that the parolee
and his home are subject to search by the
parole officer when the officer reasonably
believes that such search is necessary in
the perfon.1ance of his duties.
The parole
officer ought to know more about the
parolee than anyone else but his family.
He is therefore in a better position
than anyone else to decide whether a
search is necessary. His decision may
be based upon specific facts, though
they be less than sufficient to sustain
a finding of probable cause. It may even
be based on a "hunch," arising from
what he has learned or observed about the
behavior and attitude of the parolee.
To
grant such powers to the parole officer is
not, in our view, unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
The principal protection
against abuse of this authority is the
"helping" function of the parole officer's
job, and the training that he has received
to fit him for that job. A good parole
officer does not regard himself as a
policeman.
Id. at 250.
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In United States v. Jeffers, 573 F.2d 1074
(9th Cir. 1978), the same Court noted that a blanket
requirement to submit to warrantless searches was an
overbroad condition of probation but held that "since
the probation officer had reason to believe that
appellant was violating his probation, this search
which took place at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner was proper."

Id. at 1075.

In Hunter v. State, 139 Ga.App. 676, 229
S.E.2d 505 (1976), the court expressed what appears to
be the majority view with respect to a determination of
what searches are reasonable when conducted by probation
officers:
The search by a probation officer
is reasonable if under all the circumstances,
it is actuated by the legitimate operation
of the probation supervision process and the
probation officer acts reasonably in performing
those cluties.
Id. at 506.

See also Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905 at 90'

(Fla. 1979); Seirn v. State, 590 P. 2d 1152 at 1154 to 1155
(Nev. 1979); State v. Jeffers, 116 Ariz. 192, 568 P.2d
1090 at 1093 (1977)

(condition of probation upheld here

Vl2'

held overbroad in Unitec:i States v. Jeffers, supra, but the
specific warrantless search involved was approved in both
opinions and revocation of probation was affirmed); and
United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 at 162 (6th Cir. 19Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In this case, irrespective of whether probable
cause for an arrest or search existed, and irrespective
of whether proper consent was given for entry into the
house, Agent Reid was acting within the scope of his
duties when he sought to confront appellant and determine
if he had violated the terms of his probation.

There was

no abusive or violent action by any of the officers.

Had

Agent Reid waited until morning to confront appellant,
any indication that he had been or was consuming alcohol
might have disappeared.

Moreover, it was entirely

reasonable to accompany the young woman in an attempt to
retrieve her property.

Given appellant's probationary

status, there was no Fourth Amendment violation and
revocation of appellant's probation was appropriate.
Even if it is assumed, but not admitted, that
Agent Reid could not enter appellant's home without a
warrant or proper consent, the revocation of probation
in this matter should be affirmed.

As stated above, the

Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.
State v. Lopes, supra.

In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra,

at 332, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The touchstone of our analysis under
the fourth amendment is always "the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security.
"
The officers in this case had clear and obvious
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indications that the complaining woman lived at that
time in appellant's house.

She told them so (H. at 29).

She had only night clothes on and the rest of her

cloth~g

was said to be in appellant's bedroom (H. at 29).

The

officers had no reason to disbelieve her story or suspect
her right to consent to their entry.

Again it should be

borne in mind that no extensive search or arrest was
undertaken on the authority of her statement.

All the

officers did was to enter the house and ask to speak to
appellant.

His violent response and subsequent refusal

to submit to a breathalyzer exam caused his probation to
be revoked.

This limited invasion of ·appellant's privacy

at the consent of a woman who was sharing his roof,
however temporarily, was proper and reasonable.
Nevertheless, even if it is also assumed, but
not admitted, that the officers improperly entered
appellant's home, the revocation of appellant's probation
should still be affirmed.

It is generally held that

although the Fourth Amendment has some limited application
to probationers, application of the strict exclusionary ri
in probation revocation hearings does not serve the
of that rule.

purpo~

In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,

94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), the Court noted:
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The purpose of the exclusionary
rule is not to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim:
"[T]he ruptured privacy of
the victim's homes and effects
cannot be restored.
Reparation
comes too late." Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637, 85
s.ct. 1731, 1742, 14 L.Ed.2d 601
(1965).
Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to
deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
94 S.Ct. at 619-620.
In United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577 at
578 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court said that "[t]he exclusionary
rule does not apply to probation revocation hearings absent
a demonstration of police harassment of probationers."
See also United States v. Fredrickson, 581 F.2d 711 at 713
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Farmer, supra; United States
v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 at 1020 (9th Cir. 1975); and
United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 at 55 (9th Cir. 1975).
Clearly, the mere consideration of tainted evidence
in a probation revocation hearing does not require
reversal of a decision to revoke probation.

The damning

evidence in this case was the personally observed violence
of appellant and the refusal to submit to a breathalyzer
test (H. at 64-66).

Officers testified that beer was in

the refrigerator and that empty beer cans were in the
house

(H. at 34), but the Court did not include that
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finding.of probation violation (H. at 64-66).

Even though

the officers may not have completed the necessary formalitL
to properly enter the house, appellant's violent reaction
to a request to talk and his refusal to submit to the
reasonable request for a breathalyzer exam were unjustified.!
The officers did not threaten, or harass appellant and his
actions in violation of his probation requirements could
not be overlooked even if the officers had failed to conforr'
to all the technicalities of the law.
In summary, the entry of the officers into
appellant's home was reasonable and not in violation of
the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
searches.

The action was taken as a legitimate exercise

of a probation officers' powers necessary to the adequate
performance of his duties.

The request for submission to

a breathalyzer exam was entirely reasonable in light of
appellant's conduct.

Even if Agent Reid had no authority

on his own to enter the house, it was reasonable for the
officers to act in reliance upon the woman's representati~
that she lived in the house and could allow them to enter.
Moreover, even if she had no such authority and the office
should not have entered the house without a warrant, the
strict exclusionary rule should not be applied in the
probation revocation setting and the fact of appellant's
violent behavior and unreasonable refusal to take a
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breathalyzer exam could not have been overlooked by the
trial court.

The revocation of probation was proper

and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The evidence of appellant's reduced capacity
due to insanity and/or intoxication was not so
overwhelming as to require the jury's determination of
guilt to be overturned.

Specific intent may be inferred

from circumstantial evidence.

It cannot be said that

the jury, without doubt, acted unreasonably since they
were properly instructed as to the required proof of
intent and the potential defenses of reduced capacity
and intoxication.
The lower court's exercise of discretion in
revoking appellant's probation was also supported by
the evidence.
discretion.

There is no indication of any abuse of
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment was not violated

by the entry into appellant's horne without a warrant.

It

was reasonable for the officers to have relied upon the
apparant authority of the complainant.

In any event,

if the entry was improper, it constituted harmless
error.
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The conviction, sentence, and commitment of
appellant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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